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This entry highlights fundamental changes in the electronics industry that have 
transformed its competitive dynamics and industrial organization: a high and growing 
knowledge intensity; the rapid pace of change in technologies and markets; and extensive 
globalization. That explosive mixture of forces has created two inter-related puzzles. The 
first puzzle is that a high degree of globalization may well go hand in hand with high and 
increasing concentration. This runs counter to the dominant view, based on the 
assumption of neo-classical trade theory, that globalization will increase competition and 
hence will act as a powerful equalizer both among nations and among firms. 
Multinational corporations, after all, may not be such effective “spoilers of 
concentration”, as claimed by Richard Caves (1982). The second related puzzle is that 
this industry fails to act like a stable global oligopoly, even when concentration is 
extremely high: market positions are highly volatile, new entry is possible, and not even 
market leaders can count on a guaranteed survival.  
 
Defining the electronics industry is tricky. Recent research (e.g., Afuah, 1997) 
has shown that products are insufficient to define an industry when specialized suppliers 
exist; when there is complex market segmentation and abrupt change in demand patterns; 
when there is intense and unpredictable technical change; and when financial institutions 
accelerate the pace of industrial restructuring and increase uncertainty. All of these 
conditions prevail in the electronics industry - key sectors are in turmoil, with sectoral 
boundaries changing incessantly. For lack of a better alternative, however, we still have 
to use products and key technologies as a proxy definition.  
 
Most studies have focused on the hardware side, i.e., electronics equipment and 
components. We include in addition software, information services, and a variety of 
newly emerging markets that result from the convergence of digital information, audio 
and video, and communication technologies (e.g., internet services). This broad 
definition reflects a fundamental shift in the center of gravity of value generation (as 
defined in Lazonick, 1991) away from hardware and component technology towards 
architectural design standards, software and knowledge-intensive services. These changes 
in the technological and competitive dynamics have further increased the already high 
knowledge intensity and exposure to globalization, hence posing new challenges for 
industrial organization. The electronics industry thus is a good test case for studying 
competitive dynamics in a globalizing world. 
We first explain why it matters to understand the economics of the electronics 
industry. Part 2 provides a historical perspective on how the structure of the electronics 
  1 industry evolved, centered around a symbiotic relationship between computers and 
semiconductors. We briefly sketch the story of how IBM created the flagship model of 
industrial organization, by relying on global production networks (GPN) for 
manufacturing services, and by outsourcing the PC operating system (to Microsoft) and 
the microprocessor design (to Intel). Part 3 reviews empirical evidence on the electronics 
industry’s competition puzzles. Some possible explanations are reviewed in the fourth 
part of the entry: we distinguish sources of concentration and sources of market volatility. 
Finally, in part 5 we highlight key questions addressed in ongoing research that can 




  Understanding what forces shape the competitive dynamics of the electronics 
industry is not just an issue for sector specialists. Addressing this question has broad 
ramifications for debates on possible new sources of economic growth. 
 
  There is a broad consensus that the electronics industry is of critical importance 
for enhancing productivity, competitiveness and long-term growth. This strategic 
industry argument is based on various propositions. One is that the industry has followed, 
for more than 25 years, “Moore´s Law”, laid down by Gordon Moore, co-founder of 
Intel: every 18 months or so, the price of computing power has been halved. This change 
has provided a powerful incentive for a pervasive digitalization of economic transactions. 
A second proposition states that, provided appropriate organizational innovations are in 
place, the spread of computer-based information and communications technology (ICT) 
can drastically increase productivity across all stages of the value chain, and hence 
enhance a society’s economic growth and welfare. 
 
A third proposition emphasizes the potential of ICT to reduce the friction of time 
and space, a change that could fundamentally change the nature of economic growth. 
Proponents of the “New Economy” for instance argue that ICT has accelerated the pace 
of change in economic structures and institutions, reducing the barriers to non-
inflationary growth (e.g. OECD, 2000). Strong expectations also exist with regard to the 
spatial impact: it has been argued for instance that IT enhances both the incentives and 
the possibilities to codify knowledge, which facilitates international knowledge diffusion, 
thus broadening the scope for globalization (e.g., David and Foray, 1995). A fourth 
proposition finally highlights market failure: due to the massive externalities involved, 
investments are typically characterized by a gap between private and social rates of 
return (Arrow, 1962). This requires corrective policy interventions that provide 
incentives, as well as the necessary infrastructure, support services and human resources. 
 
These issues rank high on the priority lists of management and policy debates. 
Until the early 1990s, the car industry provided the role model with its shift from 
“Fordist” to “lean production”. This is no longer the case. Developments in the 
electronics industry are now the primary determinants of a “New Industrial 
Organization” model (e.g., Chandler et al., 1998).  Unrivaled in its degree of 
globalization and in its exposure to global competition, the electronics industry has 
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industry structure.  
 
  Management debates for instance focus on new approaches to global supply chain 
management developed in the electronics industry, such as the BTO (= built-to-order) 
production model of Dell Computer Corporation. The main concern is to reduce the high 
cost of coordination that results from extensive geographic dispersion, multiple sourcing, 
duplication of tasks and excess capacity. Equally important is that suppliers are now 
confronted with much more demanding performance, efficiency and time-to-market 
requirements. Effective time management is of the essence: Inventory turnovers have 
become a critical indicator of competitive success, in addition to profits and market 
capitalization (Fine, 1998). Some observers claim that this constitutes a new “American 
Model of Manufacturing” that is now being extended beyond electronics to a broad range 
of information-intensive and time-sensitive sectors that encompass food, garments as 
well as cars and aircraft (e.g., Florida and Sturgeon, 1999; Kenney, 2000).  
 
Policy debates both in the US and in the EU highlight the role of ICT-based 
organizational innovations as major new sources of economic growth. The same is true 
for Asia’s policy debates on post-crisis industrial upgrading. However, there is still 
substantial confusion. Most of the debates are centered on simple dichotomies that 
juxtapose for instance information (or knowledge, or network, or simply post-modern) 
society against industrial society; flexible specialization against mass production; and 
Wintelism against Fordism (e.g., Castells, 1998; Borrus, 2000). Such reductionist 
concepts are inadequate to explain the complex processes of organizational evolution in 
industry structure and firm behavior that have transformed the electronics industry. A 
brief review of how the structure of the electronics industry evolved can help to clarify 
these issues.  
  
2. Historical Perspective: The Flagship Model of Industrial Organization 
 
  It was during the late 1940s, and due to the development of the mainframe 
computer and the invention of the transistor that the US established a firm worldwide 
leadership in the electronics industry.  Despite important challenges, especially Japan’s 
catching-up in DRAM, later followed by Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (e.g., Ernst and 
O’Connor, 1992; Hobday, 1995; Ernst, 1997; Mathews and Cho, 2000), US leadership 
has remained remarkably stable. 
 
Two explanations are offered in the literature (e.g., Langlois and Steinmueller, 
1999; Bresnahan and Malerba, 1999). First, a rapid diffusion of basic technologies 
arguably has created a pool of independent specialized suppliers, the so-called 
semiconductor merchant firms that aggressively pursued international market share 
expansion and technology development. A second related argument is that rapid 
technology diffusion in the US reflects peculiar features of its competitive dynamics and 
industrial organization that were very different from those in Europe and Japan. Three 
features are normally highlighted: i) a symbiotic relationship between computers and 
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and incentives that facilitate the entry of specialized supplier start-up companies. 
 
These arguments have some plausibility. But they fail to tell the full story: the 
proliferation of specialized suppliers did not occur in isolation. While legally 
independent, these firms were closely interacting with large corporations (initially, 
AT&T and IBM, but later on including companies like Hewlett Packard and Intel) that 
acted as flagships of emerging production networks. Those networks emerged first within 
the US, but were soon extended internationally. An early exposure to globalization is 
arguably one of the important distinguishing features of the US semiconductor industry 
that explains its early leadership (e.g., Tilton, 1971; Ernst, 1983). The same is true for its 




Let us briefly look at how IBM created the flagship model of industrial 
organization by relying on global production networks (GPN) for manufacturing 
services. Similar stories can be told for other major flagship companies (e.g., Ernst, 1997; 
Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard, 2000). IBM’s move toward an integrated, worldwide 
operation dates back to 1949, when its World Trade Corporation was established. IBM’s 
“interchange plan” in Europe during the 1950s probably is one of the first systematic 
attempts to optimize its international operations by establishing a transatlantic production 
network. These efforts become much more systematic with the introduction of the IBM 
360, during the early 1960s. Essential for its success was a concerted effort of IBM R&D 
laboratories and production facilities in the US and Europe: the higher-end version 
360/40, oriented toward scientific applications, was based on a design developed in 
IBM’s Hursley laboratory in Britain, and the low-end 360/20 was developed in IBM’s 
German labs in Boeblingen. By the mid-1960s, IBM had established a transatlantic 
production network where product development and manufacturing responsibilities were 
assigned to individual laboratories and production facilities: each development laboratory 
specialized in a particular technology and carried the development responsibility for a 
product or technology for the entire company. Each IBM plant, including the US 
facilities, was given a mandate to produce specific products both for the international and 
the local market. 
 
IBM thus was the first computer company that has tried a full-scale extension of 
its value chain across national boundaries, albeit still confined to the US and Europe. 
This began to change during the 1960s: to reduce costs in manufacturing core memories 
for the 360 System, IBM began to shift the labor-intensive assembly of these components 
to low-cost “offshore” locations in Asia. IBM’s production network began to move 
beyond the transatlantic region: “An organization was quickly established in Japan to 
find vendors to [wire core arrays by hand]. Soon the work expanded to Taiwan, where a 
few thousand people were employed wiring core frames by hand. It was slow, tedious, 
meticulous work, stringing wires in just the right manner through each of the thousands 
of tiny cores in each core plane. But the cost of labor there was so low that it was actually 
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(Pugh, 1984, ibid.)  
 
IBM´s move to Asia did not occur in isolation: it was soon followed by its 
competitors who also established core array wiring operations in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. IBM thus gave rise to a new model of international production for American 
electronics firms: the redeployment of labor-intensive stages of final assembly to Asia. 
For quite some time, most of these activities were fairly mundane. Much of what was 
then called "offshore sourcing" investment consisted of screw-driver assembly, with very 
limited local value added and almost no local linkages (Ernst, 1983). This originally was 
an exclusive American affair. Two actors were the main carriers: producers and mass 
merchandisers of consumer devices, with GE and Sears & Roebuck being the most 
prominent examples; and medium-sized semiconductor "merchant" firms that were then 
still struggling to establish themselves as independent vendors on the open market.  
 
2.2 The Flagship Model in Semiconductors 
 
For semiconductors, the pioneer was Motorola which as early as 1967 established 
production lines in Hong Kong and South Korea. One year later, in 1968, it was followed 
by National Semiconductor and Texas Instruments which both chose to move first into 
Singapore. Four years later, both companies established their IC assembly lines in 
Malaysia, and were joined in the same year by Intel. Originally, the expansion of 
American semiconductor firms into East Asia was primarily driven by two concerns: 
access to cheap assembly hands and the large tariff reductions they could reap by re-
importing sub-assemblies from abroad. The over-riding goal was to improve return-on-
investments [ROIs] through cost reductions that did not require the heavy capital outlays 
that would have been necessary for factory automation at home. American semiconductor 
firms insisted on equity control through the establishment of 100-percent-owned 
affiliates, in order to minimize the risk of technology leakage. This practice is in 
accordance with the theory of foreign direct investment that argues that firms with strong 
proprietary advantages in technology have a preference for equity control.  
 
Over time, this simple concern with short-term financial savings had to give way 
to more complex motivations. During the late 1970s, Japanese firms had succeeded in 
establishing a credible challenge by automating their domestic production facilities. In 
response, American semiconductor firms were now forced to develop an international 
production strategy that would allow them to pre-empt possible attacks by Japanese firms 
through rapid cost reduction.  It is during this period that companies like Intel, Motorola 
and National Semiconductor, began to upgrade and automate their existing offshore chip 
assembly plants. In order to do so, they had to develop, albeit grudgingly, linkages with 
local suppliers and support industries. Equally important, they had to integrate these 
dispersed supply bases into integrated GPN. 
 
When the US-dollar appreciated during the early 1980s, cash-stripped American 
semiconductor firms moved one step further toward a full-blown flagship model by 
accepting forms of international production that did not necessarily involve equity 
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contract manufacturing arrangements, ranging from contract assembly to complete 
"second sourcing" agreements. Together with the continuous upgrading of existing 
affiliates, these arrangements have conveyed substantial competitive advantages to 
American semiconductor firms. 
 
2.3 Breakthrough: Microprocessors and the PC 
 
A breakthrough in the development of the flagship model came with the 
emergence of the microprocessor (MPU) that gave rise to a new kind of computer, the 
microcomputer (or PC). Both acted as disruptive technologies, as defined by Christensen 
(1997), reversing the established rules of competition. The MPU failed to have an impact 
on mainframes and minis, because it did not initially offer the computing power and 
speed that these larger machines could get from multiple logic chips.  Existing computer 
companies thus considered these machines as a small fringe market for hobbyists. The 
lower production costs of MPUs and their capacity to simplify motherboard design gave 
rise to an altogether new approach to the design of computer architectures, however, and 
soon created a thriving demand by new customers who did not need and could not afford 
the vast computing power of mainframes and minis.  
 
An important turning-point came with the Apple II, a relatively open and 
expandable machine that was designed for volume manufacturing. This compact and 
attractively designed machine created a highly profitable niche market that IBM, the 
dominant incumbent, could no longer ignore. On August 12, 1981, the entry of the IBM 
PC created a new dominant computing platform that has been instrumental in sustaining 
U.S. leadership. Equally important, but less well-known are the implications for 
industrial organization. Both the Apple II and the IBM PC were designed around a 
limited number of standard components. They also were designed as an open box ready 
for expansion, reconfiguration and continuous upgrading. This architecture gave rise to 
extensive outsourcing and a rapid geographic dispersion of the value chain. For instance, 
for the IBM PC, floppy disk drives came from Singapore-based Tandon, power supply 
from Zenith, motherboards from SCI Systems and printers from Japan`s Epson. For the 
Apple II outsourcing was even more extensive, and final assembly soon shifted to 
Singapore and Ireland.  
 
Of critical importance however is that, in order to quickly achieve market 
dominance, IBM decided to outsource the PC operating system (to Microsoft) and the 
microprocessor design (to Intel). Langlois (1992, pages 1 and 3) highlights one important 
aspect: the outsourcing of “external capabilities” that “reside within a network of 
interacting firms.” Of equal importance however is the impact on competitive dynamics 
and industrial organization. By outsourcing the operating system and the microprocessor, 
IBM enabled both Microsoft and Intel to capture de facto control over this new 
architectural standard.  
The evolution of the micro-computer accelerated the spread of the emerging 
flagship model of industrial organization. Consider a stylized GPN (Ernst, 1997): it 
combines a large, multi-divisional MNE (the flagship), its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint 
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resellers, as well as its R&D alliances and a variety of cooperative agreements, such as 
standards consortia. A network flagship like IBM or Intel breaks down the value chain 
into a variety of discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be carried out 
most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access to resources and capabilities, and 
where they are needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. 
 
The flagship model raises a number of important issues that are highly contested 
in the literature. For instance, GPN do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms 
of firm organization (as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Network 
participants differ in their access to and in their position within such networks, and hence 
face very different challenges. We use a taxonomy of network participants that 
distinguishes various hierarchical layers that range from flagship companies that 
dominate such networks, down to a variety of usually smaller, local network participants 
(Ernst, 2000d). The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and 
organizational leadership beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie 
directly under its management control. 
 
The strategy of the flagship company thus directly affects the growth, the 
strategic direction and network position of lower-end participants, like specialized 
suppliers and subcontractors. The flagship derives its strength from its control over 
critical resources and capabilities, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions 
between the different network nodes. Both are the sources of its superior capacity for 
value generation. This taxonomy helps to distinguish the different capacities of these 
firms to reap potential network benefits, and the institutions and policies required to 
support weaker network participants. 
 
One critical capability for instance is the intellectual property and knowledge 
associated with setting, maintaining and continuously upgrading a de facto market 
standard. This capability requires perpetual improvements in product features, 
functionality, performance, cost and quality. It is such “complementary assets” (Teece, 
1986) that the flagship increasingly outsources. This outsourcing has given rise to a 
proliferation of specialized suppliers, segmenting the industry into separate, yet closely 
interacting horizontal layers (Grove, 1996). The initial catalyst was the availability of 
standard components, which allows for a change in computer design away from closed 
(IBM mainframe) to open, yet owned architectural and interface standards for the PC and 
computer networks (especially the internet). Tilton (1971) convincingly demonstrates 
that very early on, the ability to put a “computer on a chip” opened up new possibilities 
of industry evolution, with American firms in control of not only the key technology but 
also the critical system integration capabilities. 
 
As a result, new options emerged for outsourcing, transforming an erstwhile 
vertically integrated industry into horizontally disintegrated, yet closely interacting 
market segments (e.g., integrated circuits, board assembly, disk drives, operating 
systems, applications software, and networking equipment). Each of these individual 
market segments became rapidly globalized, thus giving rise to the co-existence of 
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microprocessors, memories, PCs, HDD, and other components.  This process has been 
accelerated by the introduction of internet-enabled virtual integration (e.g., Ernst, 2000b). 
Each of these value chains consists of a variety of GPN that compete with each other, but 
that may also cooperate. The number of such networks and the intensity of competition 
vary across sectors, reflecting their different stages of development and their 
idiosyncratic industry structures. 
 
3. Competition Puzzles: Empirical Evidence 
 
3.1 The First Puzzle: Globalization and Concentration 
 
In important sectors of the electronics industry, globalization is accompanied by 
increasing concentration.  We first look at peculiar features of globalization, and then 
review data on concentration. 
 
a)  Peculiar features of globalization 
 
Globalization in the electronics industry combines a massive, yet highly 
concentrated, international dispersion of the value chain with an important organizational 
innovation, the spread of global production networks (GPN). These networks are a 
response to the flagship’s increasingly pervasive outsourcing requirements and the 
demanding coordination requirements of geographic dispersion: they integrate the 
dispersed supply and customer bases of  a global network flagship company (e.g., IBM, 
Cisco, Compaq, NEC, Acer or Samsung). The main purpose is to gain quick access to 
lower-cost foreign capabilities that are complementary to the flagship’s own 
competencies. The creation of GPN reflects increasing pressures to exploit 
complementarities that result from the interactive nature of knowledge creation 
(Antonelli, 1998). 
 
Take the outsourcing of volume manufacturing and related support services that 
enables global brand-name companies to combine cost reduction, product differentiation 
and time-to-market. A peculiar feature of this new model of industrial organization is that 
manufacturing is de-coupled from product development, and is dispersed across firm and 
national boundaries. With an average annual growth of more than 25%, the so-called 
electronics manufacturing services  (EMS) market is one of the fastest growing 
electronics sectors, expanding twice as quickly as the total electronics industry. The role 
model for such changes is Solectron, the world’s largest EMS provider, with FY 1999 
revenues of $ 8.4 billion. With a CAGR of 43% over the past five years, Solectron has 
now more than 46,000 employees in 41 locations worldwide, with more than 9 million 
square feet of capacity. 
 
The network flagship outsources not only manufacturing, but also a variety of 
high-end, knowledge-intensive support services. Most research on the location of 
knowledge-intensive activities has focused on the role of R&D, but this may be a too 
narrow focus (for details, see Ernst, 2000c). It is necessary to cast the net wider and to 
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services that are intrinsically linked with production. Even if these activities do not 
involve formal R&D, they may still give rise to considerable learning and innovation. 
The latter include for instance trial production (prototyping and ramping-up), tooling and 
equipment, benchmarking of productivity, testing, process adaptation, product 
customization and supply chain coordination. 
 
The result is that an increasing share of the value-added becomes dispersed across 
the boundaries of the firm as well as across national borders. Let us look at some 
indicators. A good proxy of geographic dispersion are the growing methodological 
problems that one encounters when one tries to determine the importance of individual 
countries and regions in the world electronics market. The difficulties reflect the fact that 
final products, almost without exception, involve substantial inputs across the value chain 
that are produced in diverse locations across the globe. 
 
Two measures exist: one is based on company ownership, the other on the 
country of origin of exports. Both market share measures were largely similar, as long as 
trade was the most important vehicle for international market share expansion. Both 
indicators however began to diverge, once production dispersed across borders. Take 
semiconductors (Reed Electronics Research, 1998): there is a huge gap between the US 
share of world exports (18%) and its market share based on company ownership (32%). 
This suggests that a very high share of US production is taking place overseas. The gap 
between ownership-based and export market shares is even higher for Asia (38% by 
country of origin, versus 19% by ownership), but is the inverse of the US relation, thus 
suggesting that Asia has attracted the bulk of investments not only from the US but also 
from Japan and Europe.  
 
Geographic dispersion however is heavily concentrated in a few specialized local 
clusters. For instance, the supply chain of a computer company typically spans different 
time zones and continents, and integrates a multitude of transactions and local clusters.  
The degree of dispersion differs across the value chain: it increases, the closer one gets to 
the final product, while dispersion remains concentrated especially for critical precision 
components. On one end of the spectrum is final PC assembly that is widely dispersed to 
major growth markets in the US, Europe and Asia. Dispersion is still quite extended for 
standard, commodity-type components (“homogeneous products” in the parlance of 
industrial economists), but less so than for final assembly. For instance, keyboards, 
computer mouse devices and power switch supplies are sourced from many different 
locations, both in Asia, Mexico and the European periphery, with Taiwanese firms 
playing a major role as supply coordinators. The same is true for lower-end printed 
circuit boards.  
 
Concentration of dispersion increases, the more we move toward more complex, 
capital-intensive precision components: memory devices and displays are sourced 
primarily from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; and hard disk drives from a 
Singapore-centered triangle of locations in Southeast Asia. Finally, dispersion becomes 
most concentrated for high-precision, design-intensive components that pose the most 
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master: microprocessors are sourced from a few globally dispersed affiliates of Intel, two 
secondary American suppliers, and one recent entrant from Taiwan, Via Technologies.  
 
The  hard disk drive (HDD) industry provides another example both for the 
breath-taking speed of geographic dispersion, as well as for its spatial concentration 
(Ernst, 1997).  Until the early 1980s, almost all HDD production was concentrated in the 
United States, with limited additional production facilities in Japan and Europe. Today, 
only 1 percent of the final assembly of HDDs has remained in the US, while Southeast 
Asia dominates with almost 70% of world production, based on units shipped. Slightly 
less than half of the world’s disk drives come from Singapore, with most of the rest of the 
region’s production being concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
 
Let us take a closer look at firm-level developments. The global production 
network (GPN) of Seagate, the current industry leader provides a good example of 
concentrated dispersion. Today, Seagate operates 22 plants worldwide: 14 of these 
plants, i.e., 64% of the total, are located in Asia. Asia's share in Seagate's worldwide 
production capacity, as expressed in square feet, has increased from roughly 35% in 1990 
to slightly more than 61% in 1995 - an incredible speed of expansion. Concentrated 
dispersion is also reflected in the regional breakdown of Seagate's employment. Asia's 
share increased from around 70% in 1990 to more than 85% in 1995.  
 
The fact that Asia's share in employment is substantially higher than its share in 
capacity, while the opposite is true for the US, indicates a clear-cut division of labor: 
labor-intensive volume manufacturing has been shifted to Asia, while the US retains the 
high-end, knowledge-intensive stages of the value chain. Asia has absorbed most of the 
high-volume assembly activities and the production of low- and mid-range components. 
Precision component manufacturing and R&D however remain firmly entrenched in a 
few highly specialized regions like Bloomington and Minneapolis (both in Minnesota) 
and in California. For instance, Seagate Magnetics, the affiliate that produces media, has 
concentrated all production in California. And wafer fabrication, a core process of head 
manufacturing, is concentrated in Minnesota, as is automatic slider fabrication for MR 
heads. This is in line with similar specialization patterns displayed by other leading HDD 
producers. 
 
We need to add a further aspect: an extreme spatial concentration within East 
Asia which now handles most of Seagate´s volume manufacturing. Slightly more than 
92% of Seagate's capacity in Asia is concentrated in three locations: in Bangkok (almost 
32%), Penang (more than 30%) and Singapore (a bit less than 30%). And almost 50% 
(26,000 out of 55,000) of Seagate's Asian employment is concentrated in its plant in the 
outskirts of Bangkok. These data indicate that Bangkok is the centre for low labor cost 
volume manufacturing. Next comes Singapore with more than 27% (15,000), 
substantially more than Malaysia's 16% (9,000 people). For both Singapore and 
Malaysia, the low ratio of employment relative to its share in Seagate's production 
capacity indicates that production facilities have been rapidly automated and include now 
higher-end manufacturing activities such as component manufacturing. 
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Over time, Seagate has developed a quite articulate regional division of labor in 
East Asia. Bottom-end work is done in Indonesia and China. Malaysian and Thai plants 
make components and specialize in partial assembly. Singapore is the centre of gravity of 
this regional production network: its focus is on higher-end products and some important 
coordination and support functions. It completes the regional production network, by 




  Concentration in the electronics industry is high and often keeps rising, despite a 
heavy exposure to globalization. It is well known that, in terms of market shares, both 
computer operating systems and microprocessors are each overwhelmingly dominated by 
one company, Microsoft and Intel respectively. Concentration is also substantial for high 
precision key components that are critical for architectural design and performance 
features, such as DRAM, advanced displays, and hard disk drives (HDD). Let us look at 
relevant data for the latter industry. 
 
Market share data indicate a very high degree of concentration: five companies 
account for roughly 85% of worldwide non-captive HDD sales. Concentration ratios are 
also very high for key components. Take head assembly: the 10 largest head 
manufacturers account for 93% of the market by volume, with the largest six firms alone 
controlling 78%. One indicator of increasing concentration is the rapid decline in the 
number of worldwide drive manufacturers: the total shrunk from 59 in 1990 to 24 in 
1995, with most of the decline taking place after 1993. In 1995, nine companies went out 
of business, and only three companies entered the fray, all of them in niche markets. 
During the same year, Seagate, the current market leader, acquired Conner Peripherals, 
the company that, in 1992, was the world market leader. Furthermore, two heavyweights, 
Hewlett Packard and DEC, left the HDD industry altogether during 1996. 
 
High and increasing concentration can also be found for other key components. 
Take DRAM (= dynamic random access memories), the largest segment of the 
semiconductor market. The DRAM market is now even more concentrated than the world 
oil industry was at the peak of the rule of the infamous seven sisters: six business groups 
control almost 88% of the world market (up from 67.1% in 1998). Of even more 
importance, the four top firms now control more than two-thirds of the DRAM market 
(up from 50.8% in 1998). 
 
We find increasing concentration even in the PC industry, an industry which only 
a decade ago was hailed by neo-liberals as a holy grail of free competition (e.g., Gilder, 
1989). The top four market players - Compaq, Dell, IBM and Hewlett Packard - have 
consistently expanded their combined global market share from less than 27% in 1996 to 
37.3% in 1999. During this period, the four industry leaders have captured almost 70% of 
PC unit growth worldwide. Concentration is substantially higher in the all-important US 
market, where the top four PC makers now hold about 68%. Concentration is also very 
high and rapidly increasing for notebooks, an industry that used to be crowded by many 
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68.3% in 1996, and stands now around 75%. 
 
Similar trends can be observed in the electronics manufacturing services industry. 
While only a few years ago, many of these firms were of humble size, concentration is 
now increasing at a breath-taking pace, based on a wave of M&A. During 1999, more 
than 100 mergers occurred in this sector, up from 50 in 1997. If this trend continues, this 
industry will be soon dominated by handful of large, integrated manufacturing service 
providers, each with revenues of at least $ 10 bn. Solectron’s recent purchase of Nortel’s 
worldwide manufacturing operations documents the speed of these transformations. At 
one stroke, this acquisition expanded Solectron’s global production capacity by 1.2m 
square feet, an increase of capacity of roughly 20%.  
 
Finally, concentration keeps rising rapidly even in newly emerging sectors such 
as internet software and networking equipment, despite the fact that there are new 
entrants by the droves. In the market for ISPs (=internet service providers), huge global 
telecommunications companies, together with the market leader AOL have aggressively 
increased their market share through a wave of M&A. Equally important is an increase in 
concentration in the rapidly growing ASP (= application service providers) market. As 
that market becomes more profitable, large global players have become the dominant 
players. Included among these dominant ASPs are computer & software companies 
(Oracle, Sun Microsystems, IBM, Intel, and HP), telecommunications companies (AT&T 
and Qwest), consulting companies (KPMG) and financial firms (e.g., Merrill Lynch). 
 
In the market for networking equipment, Cisco’s original leadership position has 
been eroded by multiple attacks. Telecommunications equipment vendors, especially 
Nortel Networks and Lucent Technologies, have entered the fray. Cisco has responded in 
kind by entering the market for telecommunications equipment. In addition, computer 
companies, such as IBM, Compaq and HP are also now producing some networking 
equipment (e.g., switches, hubs, and adapter cards), although they are not yet as major 
players. 
 
As a result, a small group of North American firms dominates networking 
equipment, with very limited competition from suppliers in Japan and Europe. 
Competition between the top firms (Nortel, Cisco, 3Com and Lucent) is very intense and 
has fueled various rounds of mega-M&A, hence it is possible to talk about an unstable 
global oligopoly. As in other sectors of the electronics industry, increasing concentration 
goes hand in hand with substantial volatility of market positions. What sets the 
networking equipment industry apart, is the extremely rapid pace of technological change 
which is concentrated in two areas: increased network bandwidth and transmission speed 
to alleviate congestion. The result is an industry in turmoil where incumbents as well as a 
handful of new entrants fiercely compete for market positions.  
 
3.2 The Second Puzzle: Concentration and Volatility 
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concentration is very high, the electronics industry fails to act like a stable global 
oligopoly (as predicted, for instance by Borrus, 1989, and Ferguson and Morris, 1993). 
Take again the example of the HDD industry.  
 
According to Blair (1972), oligopoly begins when the four largest firms hold 
more than 25% of overall sales. Between 25 and 50%, this oligopoly is loose and 
unstable, but above 50%, it becomes firm and clearly established. With five companies 
holding roughly 85% of the global market, we would have to conclude that the HDD 
industry is controlled by a very tight oligopoly. This conclusion however does not square 
well with the fact that the HDD industry is a continuous prey to cut-throat price wars and 
highly volatile market positions. Despite a number of major shake-outs, the industry 
remains highly unstable: market positions keep changing at short notice, and not even 
market leaders can count on a guaranteed survival. For instance, Conner Peripherals was 
the market leader in 1992, with 24%. Yet, one year later, Quantum had leapfrogged both 
Conner and Seagate to become No. 1. Conner Peripherals in turn fell back to the third 
position, and saw its market share erode to 16% in 1994. In 1995, the industry 
experienced yet another round of swapping market leadership positions, with Seagate 
now re-capturing the top position from Quantum. 
 
Furthermore, successful entry did occur, albeit in an indirect manner. Probably 
the most interesting case is that of Matsushita Kotobuki (MKE), an affiliate of the 
powerful Matsushita group. Since 1984 Kotobuki had been content to remain an 
apparently humble contract manufacturer for Quantum, one of the leading American 
drive producers. Today, MKE produces Quantum´s full product range, including the 
highly profitable high-end drives for mainframes and network servers. One wonders how 
long MKE will wait till it disconnects itself from Quantum and enters the market on its 
own. A second example of successful entry is the Korean Hyundai group, which in 1995, 
acquired 100% ownership of Maxtor, one of the industry’s pioneers. Since then, Maxtor 
has experienced a highly successful comeback, and is now considered to be one of the 
industry leaders in technology, quality and speed-of-response. 
 
Major changes are currently again transforming this industry, with the result of a 
drastic re-positioning of market shares and a redefinition of the rules of competition. The 
result is a pervasive profit squeeze and a fall in asset prices: HDD firms that are 
negatively affected by these developments, are forced into a defensive chain reaction. 
The most prominent example is the erosion of Seagate’s market leadership position since 
the fall of 1997. This decline in market share reflects an accelerated pace of market 
volatility. IBM, the sleeping giant, has finally woken up and is now aggressively 
competing for market share, based on its leadership in the technology of key components 
like MR heads. Japanese competitors (especially Fujitsu) have aggressively developed a 
highly productive low-cost production base in the Philippines. As Fujitsu is much larger 
than the current industry leader Seagate, it has the resources necessary for this aggressive 
frontal attack. Other new contenders include Toshiba, Hitachi, NEC and Samsung that all 
have invested in an aggressive market share expansion strategy.  
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The empirical evidence on the competitive dynamics of the electronics industry 
runs counter to much of the established literature. What are possible explanations? 
 
4.1 Brief Review of Literature 
 
For quite some time, the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm 
dominated the debate on competition. In this view market structure, as captured by 
concentration of sellers, is the primary determinant of both conduct and performance. 
One of the classic sources (Bain, 1968) argues that high levels of sellers’ concentration, 
protected by high entry barriers, will induce firms to engage in price collusion, which 
inevitably will constrain static efficiency allocation as well as learning. 
 
The SCP paradigm has lost much of its earlier grip on the debate. The theory of 
“contested markets” argues that even highly concentrated industries will be forced to 
price competitively, provided they face the “ discipline of potential hit-and run entry.” 
(Baumol et al, 1982). The crux of this analysis is the existence of “sunk costs”: the higher 
they are, the less likely is the market to be contestable. The electronics industry, with its 
high “sunk costs” due to R&D, thus should be less contestable.  
 
Globalization however implies that even markets that are characterized by 
substantial sunk costs, may become contestable: foreign firms who have already incurred 
the necessary sunk cost in their home markets, may very well be able to enter overseas 
markets. This observation has provoked some counter-arguments that come to very 
different conclusions. As globalization leads to market expansion, sunk costs and scale 
economies increase apace, further increasing concentration. The latter may well square 
with intense price competition. Paradoxically enough, such price wars may cause higher 
concentration by forcing out marginal producers and by reducing margins for potential 
entrants (Sutton, 1991). Such, in fact, has been the case for the HDD industry: prices 
have been falling about 30% per year for more than a decade, fostering increasing 
concentration. Note however, once concentration reaches a certain level, there may well 
be a reversal of pricing trends. For instance, the drastic increase in concentration in the 
PC industry reported earlier, has led to some price increases during the first quarter of 
2000, after a long period of dramatic price falls (Ernst, 2000a).  
 
4.2 An Alternative Approach 
 
In short, the literature allows for conflicting explanations. A major weakness of 
the “sunk costs” perspective is its failure to address the critical role of innovation. This is 
a general weakness of “industrial organization” (I.O.) theory. According to Richard 
Lipsey, “most I.O. theory is about competition in prices, quantities (short run) and 
capacity (long run) when in fact the competition that really matters, and that drives firms´ 
successes and failures, is competition in technologies (very long run). …(This) has led to 
increasingly fierce competition among oligopolistic firms even when there are only a few 
in any one industry.”(Letter to the author, October 10, 2000) 
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An alternative approach can be based on a recent paper by George B. Richardson 
(Richardson 1996) that argues that competition for given products is only the tip of the 
iceberg: “We concentrate too much .. on monopoly revenue being obtained by the 
restriction of supply, and as threatened by entrants who might increase that supply.” 
(Richardson 1996, p.4) Yet, competition in reality centers on development and 
innovation.  Such technological competition is especially true in the electronics industry. 
Christensen’s excellent book on “disruptive technologies” (1997) provides a second 
equally important source for an alternative explanation of the puzzling competitive 
dynamics of the electronics industry.  
 
a)  Competitive dynamics and innovation 
 
Fundamental changes in the electronics industry have transformed its competitive 
dynamics: a high and growing knowledge intensity, combined with the rapid pace of 
change in technologies and markets have given rise to an extensive globalization. Let us 
focus on the dual impact of ICT: it both increases the need and creates new opportunities 
for globalization. This argument is based on two propositions. First, the cost and risk of 
developing ICT has been a primary cause for market globalization: international markets 
are required to amortize fully the enormous R&D expenses associated with rapidly 
evolving process and product technologies (Kobrin, 1997, p.149). Of equal importance 
are the huge expenses for ICT-based organizational innovations. (Ernst and O`Connor, 
1992: chapter 1). As the extent of a company’s R&D effort is determined by the nature of 
its technology and competition rather than its size, this rapid growth of R&D spending 
requires a corresponding expansion of sales, if profitability is to be maintained. No 
national market, not even the US market, is large enough to amortize such huge expenses. 
 
A second proposition explains why international production rather than exports 
have become the main vehicle for international market share expansion. Partly this 
change reflects the pace of liberalization: while originally international production was 
driven by the need to overcome protective barriers (“tariff-hopping”), over time 
liberalization has become a major pull factor. Of critical importance however has been 
the enabling role played by ICT: it has substantially increased the mobility, i.e., 
dispersion, of firm-specific resources and capabilities across national boundaries; it also 
provides greater scope for cross-border linkages, i.e., integration. Developments in ICT 
have substantially reduced the friction of time and space, both with regard to markets and 
production: a firm can now serve distant markets equally well as local producers; it can 
also now disperse its value chain across national borders, in order to select the most cost-
effective location. 
 
In addition, ICT and related organizational innovations provide effective 
mechanisms for the international diffusion of knowledge that is required to establish, 
operate and continuously upgrade spatially dispersed locations. It is now possible to 
construct an infrastructure that can link together and coordinate economic transactions at 
distant locations. This possibility has important implications for organizational choices 
and locational strategies of firms. In essence, ICT fosters the development of leaner, 
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borders. The underlying vision is that of a network of firms that is able to respond 
quickly to changing circumstances, even if much of its value chain has been dispersed. 
 
The growth of these networks has drastically changed the dynamics of 
competition. Again, we reduce the complexity of these changes and concentrate on the 
most important impact: the emergence of a “winner-takes-all” competition model: “… 
the player with the largest share in a horizontal layer is the one who wins” (Grove, 1996). 
This outcome implies that economies of scale and scope are of critical importance for 
competitive success, especially for key components like microprocessors and operating 
systems. Equally important however is a capacity to control open-but-owned 
architectural and interface standards (Ernst and O’Connor, 1992; Borrus, Ernst, and 
Haggard, 2000). 
 
A third important feature of the new competition model is found in the 
increasingly demanding requirements for time management and coordination. The rapid 
pace of change of ICT has drastically shortened the product-life-cycle: only those 
companies thrive that succeed in bringing new products to the relevant markets ahead of 
their competitors. Of critical importance is that the firm can build specialized capabilities 
quicker and at less cost than its competitors (Kogut and Zander, 1993). The increasing 
segmentation of the electronics industry furthermore requires a capacity to coordinate 
dense interactions between independent market segments that feed into the final system 
products.  
 
Fourth, all of this reorganization needs to be combined with aggressive price 
cutting across the board. PC prices have fallen by 20% or more over the last two years, 
giving rise to razor-thin profit margins - 1.5% margins are the current average for 
standard PCs. Deflationary pricing pressures are driven by an apparently unstoppable 
move towards low-end products, such as cheap PCs and mobile devices, thus intensifying 
the industry’s profit squeeze. 
 
Finally, an important additional constraint is that pricing strategies at the level of 
systems brand name companies (e.g., Compaq) or subassembly producers (e.g., Seagate) 
are determined by the frequently abrupt price changes implemented by the lead suppliers 
of key components (e.g., Intel). Even minor increases in the price of a microprocessor or 
a display can produce substantial losses. On the other hand, sudden price declines for 
such components can also have very negative consequences, if the company has over-
stocked these components. In 1999 for instance, PC components have declined in value at 
1% or more per month, giving rise to very high inventory costs. 
 
b) Disruptive  technologies 
 
“Disruptive  technologies” underperform relative to established products in 
mainstream markets today, but may be fully performance-competitive in the same market 
tomorrow. Disruptive technologies differ from “sustaining technologies” which improve 
the performance of established products that mainstream customers in mainstream 
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different products: they have features that, initially only a few fringe (and generally new) 
customers value. Products based on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, 
simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use. 
 
Disruptive technologies can help to explain why high concentration coexists with 
high market volatility. The explanation derives from the puzzling fact that incumbents 
apparently face more severe barriers to invest in disruptive technologies than new 
entrants. This is so for four reasons: i) These technologies are simpler and cheaper, and 
thus promise lower margins, not greater profits: “It is very difficult for a company whose 
cost structure is tailored to compete in high-end markets to be profitable in low-end 
markets as well” (Christensen, 1997, p.XX). ii) Disruptive technologies are first 
commercialized in emerging and insignificant markets that large companies have great 
difficulties to address. iii) The incumbents’ most profitable customers generally do not 
want, and initially cannot use products based on disruptive technologies. And iv) a break 
of routine requires a different organizational design from sustaining technologies that can 
rely on customary routines. 
 
In short, disruptive technologies provide a constant threat to the excessive product 
differentiation pursued by incumbents to reap the benefits of premium pricing. New 
entrants however face relatively low entry barriers for such technologies, compared to the 
entry barriers that characterize sustaining technologies. 
 
c)  Stylized model of competitive dynamics 
 
That explosive mixture of conflicting requirements explains the co-existence of 
concentration and market volatility in the electronics industry. More specifically, we 
distinguish sources of concentration that may stabilize markets from sources of market 
volatility. Among the first, we highlight the role of “scale economies” in manufacturing, 
and the heavy “sunk cost” of rapid innovation and of developing complex capabilities. 
The latter are of increasing importance, reflecting a growing knowledge intensity. 
 
As for the sources of market volatility, we consider: periodic spurts of rapid 
capacity expansion due to extremely short product cycles; a complex supply chain that 
leads to periodic shortages in key components; and disruptive changes in demand and 
technology. A sectoral approach is of the essence: we need to identify basic 
characteristics of an industry, in order to understand what forces shape competitive 
dynamics. To illustrate this stylized model of competitive dynamics, we focus on data 
from the HDD industry.  
 
4.3 Sources of Concentration 
 
a)  Scale economies in manufacturing 
 
Rising minimum economies of scale are an important driver of concentration in 
the HDD industry. In final assembly, scale economies are largely attributable to costly 
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test equipment. Huge investments are also required in precision tools, molds and dies that 
are required to make the various high-precision components and parts that go into the 
drive. For some of these components, like thin-film or MR recording heads, minimum 
economies of scale are as high as those required for integrated circuits. 
 
Minimum economies of scale have grown very rapidly over time. For instance, in 
1989 an annual production capacity of between 900,000 and 1 million units was regarded 
as economic scale (Ernst and O’Connor, 1992, p.194). Since then, a dramatic increase 
has occurred in minimum scale. Take the 1996 capacity figures reported by Maxtor-
Hyundai, which is in line with other comparable projects. For its main plant in Singapore, 
Maxtor reports a capacity of 4 million drives, but this capacity is not per year, but just per 
quarter. In other words, annual capacity at this plant now is around 16 million units.  
 
b)  Sunk costs of innovation and capability development 
 
A second important driver of concentration is the very high sunk costs of rapid 
innovation and of developing complex capabilities. The HDD industry is characterized 
by a breakneck speed of technical change: areal density, i.e., the amount of information 
that can be stored on a given area of magnetic disk surface, is increasing at about 60% a 
year. The speed of access to data is also rapidly increasing. In order to cope with both 
these requirements, HDD firms must be able to tap into scientific knowledge across a 
broad front, covering areas like magnetics, coding, and electronics. They also need to 
master a variety of very demanding technological capabilities.  
 
HDDs are high-precision machines that contain and rotate rigid disks on which 
data is magnetically recorded and that control the flow of information to and from those 
disks. This technology requires a variety of high precision engineering capabilities, for 
instance for the production of miniature motors that need to work under extremely 
demanding tolerances. This industry also requires the mastery of incredibly complex 
process technologies that are used for coating disks with very thin films of magnetic 
materials (the so-called deposition technique) and for producing specialized integrated 
circuits. In addition to some of the most sophisticated component manufacturing 
technologies, the final assembly of these drives requires leading-edge automation 
techniques, such as surface-mount technology.  
 
Yet, while manufacturing matters, it is only part of the story. Competitive success 
in this industry crucially depends on the capacity to develop innovative architectural 
designs that can provide cost-effective solutions to the manifold trade-offs that exist 
between size, storage capacity and access time of these drives. Finally, leading-edge 
software capabilities are an equally important prerequisite for developing a viable HDD 
industry. Both architectural design and software capabilities have been of crucial 
importance as instruments for product development and differentiation strategies. In 
short, generating a constant stream of new products and key components requires huge 
sunk costs. The latter deter potential new entrants; they also force incumbents to increase 
their market share. 
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4.4 Sources of Market Volatility 
 
a)  Extremely short product cycles 
 
Competition in the HDD industry is driven by the speed of new product 
introduction, with the result that product life cycles become shorter and shorter. On 
average, a new product generation is introduced every 9 months, and for some products 
the cycle can be as short as six months, almost as short as for fashion-intensive garments. 
These short cycles lead to a rapid depreciation of plants and equipment and of R&D. Like 
semiconductors, the HDD industry thus falls prey to a  "scissors effect" between rapidly 
increasing fixed capital costs and an accelerated depreciation of its assets (Ernst, 1983). 
The result is that speed-to-market is of critical importance - a firm must be able to ramp 
up production quickly to competitive yields and quality.  
 
Spurts of capacity expansion result from the importance of speed-to-market. Each 
time that a new product generation is introduced, HDD firms engage in a frantic race to 
become the first supplier. HDD producers thus have all become masters in ramping-up 
production at short notice. The result is a built-in tendency for an overshooting of 
investment relative to demand growth. This has a paradoxical consequence. As 
mismatches between demand and supply occur periodically, a capacity to exit rapidly 
becomes as important as a capacity for rapid capacity expansion. Fast ramping-up and 
ramping-down hang together and require very quick responses to changes in markets and 
technology.  
 
Short product cycles thus are an important source of market volatility. Even with 
all the progress made in the flexibility of supply chain management, it is very difficult to 
avoid periodic mismatches between supply and demand. Each time the supply of HDDs 
overshoots demand, price wars break out. The result is that HDD producers must 
combine cost leadership with technology leadership and speed-to-market, a combination 
that can threaten even apparently unbeatable market leaders. 
 
b)  A complex supply chain  
 
 A complex supply chain can be a second important source of market volatility.  
Logistical requirements are very demanding in the HDD industry: a wide variety of high-
precision components and sub-assemblies needs to be procured from a variety of 
suppliers that are spread over different time zones and continents. Such global supply 
chains are prone to frequent disruptions. Suppliers, for instance, can cause such 
disruptions through late delivery or through the delivery of defective materials. Of equal 
importance are periodic supply shortages for key components such as heads, media, 
integrated circuits and precision motors. Geographic distance often magnifies the impact 
of such disruptions. These supply shortages lead to another paradox. While HDD firms 
excel in the rapid ramp-up of the final assembly lines, disruptions in the supply chain can 
easily thwart this achievement: if everything else is in place, but one tiny component is 
missing, all the efforts to ramp up production in time have been in vain.  
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That vulnerability keeps rising further with an increasing reliance on outsourcing. 
The case of Maxtor illustrates how deadly this vulnerability can be. Maxtor’s main 
weakness has been a lack of strong in-house circuit design expertise, forcing the 
company to outsource key circuitry. In 1995, at the peak of a periodic shortage of DRAM 
and other chips, supply disruptions led to a dramatic fall in Maxtor’s market share and its 
acquisition by Hyundai.  
 
c)  Disruptive changes in demand and technology 
 
Finally, disruptive changes in demand due to competing technologies are 
powerful causes of market volatility. As suppliers of an intermediate input to the 
computer industry, HDD firms compete for design-ins by computer companies. The latter 
thus exert a considerable influence on the product mix, the product cycle and the pricing 
strategies of HDD vendors. Decisions on the product mix are shaped by the increasing 
storage requirements of computers and their applications. Annual increases in areal 
density and speed are fairly predictable, as long as there are no trajectory-disrupting 
innovations.  
 
Two types of trajectory-disrupting innovations can be distinguished: a threat from 
competing technologies and break-through innovations in the drive design and in 
component technology that would drastically improve disk drive capacity, performance 
and cost. There are a number of competing technologies: optical storage offers higher 
capacity, tape drives lower cost, RAM chips far better speed, and flash EEPROM more 
durability for portable applications. There is a widespread consensus that, so far, none of 
these competing technologies poses a serious threat to HDD. 
 
Of critical importance however are break-through innovations in architectural 
design and in component technology that have periodically caused quite serious turmoil 
in the HDD industry.  For instance, new optical data storage technologies are currently 
emerging that may have trajectory-disrupting effects. Such a technological change 
privileges newcomers to the HDD market like Sony and Philips which have strong 
positions in optical technologies; it creates a serious problem for the current market 
leader Seagate which is weak in these technologies.  
 
No HDD company can afford to neglect such demand volatility. Much depends 
on the kind of customers to which the HDD company is linked. If these customers are 
established market leaders intent on sustaining the status quo, there is a danger that the 
HDD manufacturer may be locked into a trap of obsolete architectural designs. If 
however the HDD company succeeds to broaden its customer base to include computer 
companies that are intent to develop new markets and applications, there are much 
stronger incentives to proceed with architectural paradigm shifts. A passive subordination 
to customer needs can be a trap: market leaders in the HDD industry often listened too 
attentively to their established customers and ignored new product architectures whose 
initial appeal was in seemingly marginal markets. 
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nature of demand as on the constraints resulting from available technologies 
(Christensen, 1997). An exclusive focus on the development of key components may not 
be sufficient. Nor for that matter does a strength in architectural design alone guarantee 
competitive success. Both need to be combined with a capacity to identify and develop 
new markets for new applications. Take the example of IBM’s storage division, the 
creator of the HDD industry. Although it was the first to develop most of the key 
components and although it was unrivaled in its accumulated capacity for architectural 
design, IBM was arguably the last firm in the industry to incorporate leading-edge 
components across the spectrum of its product line. Reflecting its high level of its 
organizational costs, IBM was eager to reap premium prices: it thus normally used 
sophisticated componentry only in high-end drives. This practice opened the door for 
new entrants like Seagate and others that were able to start with much lower 
organizational costs and hence could afford to develop new markets for smaller-size disk 
drives for desktop computers that generated much lower unit profits, but quickly grew 
into huge mass markets. 
 
Strong product and market development capabilities thus are of critical 
importance for sustaining industrial leadership positions. The conclusion that matters for 
our purposes is that no HDD company can afford to neglect the possibility of trajectory-
disrupting innovations. This fact of life obviously adds quite substantially to the 
complexity of the competitive challenges in this industry, broadening the scope for 
market volatility 
 
5. Key questions for ongoing research 
 
This brief review of research on how competitive dynamics reshapes industrial 
organization in the electronics industry clearly indicates that we can no longer take for 
granted some of the earlier credos of competition theory. We need to take a fresh look at 
the determinants of market structure and firm behavior. We need an analysis that takes 
into account the possibility of unexpected and radical transformation that is due to the 
extremely rapid change in technology and markets: “The fact that we cannot, in the 
nature of things, predict changes that will radically transform the industry’s landscape 
should not lead us to doubt that changes will come about; only ignorance of history, and 
poverty of imagination, would lead us to that conclusion.” (Richardson, 1997, p. 9) 
 
Due to the rapid pace of change in ICT, radical transformations occur quite 
frequently in the electronics industry. The following quote from the director of the Rank 
Xerox Cambridge Laboratory illustrates the challenge: “..Both the pace and the 
acceleration of innovation are startling; nay terrifying....No-one can predict the ... range 
of skills which will need to be amassed to create and take advantage of the next 
revolution but one (and thinking about the next but one is what everyone is doing. The 
game is already over for the next).” (Anderson, 1997). This hectic pace of change 
arguably is the most important economic characteristic of the electronics industry. 
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under constant threat of displacement: “...(W)here the scope for innovation is particularly 
high, a fresh approach may often prove successful and past success and experience can 
trammel as well as support. Only myopia can lead one to believe that a commanding 
position is unassailably and continuously secure. ... The established firm, however 
mighty it may seem, can be brought down, or at least for a time eclipsed, by 
complacency, by arrogance, or simply by the fact that market opportunities or technical 
possibilities change in a way that favours others with different mind-sets, more relevant 
experience, more appropriate market connections, or simply greater luck.” (Richardson, 
1997, p.7). 
 
We still know very little about this important topic. Attempts to move a bit further 
ahead into this uncharted territory, need to address, both theoretically and empirically, a 
number of important questions. For instance, to what degree can one generalize the above 
findings, i.e., how does the electronics industry differ from other knowledge-intensive 
manufacturing and service industries? Second, what conclusions can one draw from this 
analysis for the impact of globalization on market structure and competition in the great 
bulk of industries that are less knowledge-intensive and hence less prone to sunk costs, 
and that are also less time-sensitive and prone to disruptive changes in demand?  
 
Third, to what degree have recent developments in ICT, and especially the 
internet, further increased the already high knowledge-intensity and exposure to 
globalization, hence posing new competitive challenges for the electronics industry? 
Fourth, what changes have occurred in the locus of economies of scale and scope? And 
how has the increasing cost and risk of technology development affected entry barriers? 
Fifth, under what conditions can global production networks (GPN) in these industries 
enhance the diffusion of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders, and 
hence create new entry possibilities for smaller firms and economies? Sixth, how valid 
are claims that the electronics industry, and especially its incarnation in the US, has given 
rise to a New Economy growth model that allows for higher rates of non-inflationary 
growth? And what are its opportunity and welfare costs, and its impacts on a society’s 
long-term innovation potential? And, finally, what are the normative implications for 
government policies and firm strategies that would facilitate attempts to increase market 
contestability? 
 
In the final analysis what really matters is the dynamics of change. We need an 
analysis that explicitly distinguishes different periods in the development of an industry. 
Such an evolutionary theory of industrial dynamics will show that the relationships 
between market structure, conduct and performance undergo considerable changes over 
time. The result is that, for each of these periods, different sets of strategies and policies 




Afuah, A.N.,1997∗, “Responding to Structural Industrial Changes: A 
Technological Evolution Perspective”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 6, #1, 183-
  22 202 (Explores how industry boundaries are changing in response to technological 
change.) 
Anderson, B., 1997∗, “R&D Knowledge Creation as a Bazaar Economy”, paper 
presented at workshop on Competition and Innovation in the Information Society, 
OECD, Paris, 19th March (The director of the Rank Xerox Cambridge Laboratory 
identifies necessary changes in intra- and intra-firm knowledge management, in response 
to accelerated pace of innovation) 
Antonelli, C., 1998∗, The Microdynamics of Technological Change, Routledge, 
London etc (Provides robust analytical framework for the new economics of knowledge 
creation, in response to the spread of information & communications technology.) 
Arrow, K.J. (1962) ∗, "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing", 
Review of Economic Studies, June (Classical micro-economic treatment of extrenalities 
in innovation: analysis of the public good nature of technological knowledge is based on 
the assumption that knowledge and information coincide) 
Bain, J.S., 1958∗, Industrial Organization, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York 
(Classical source on structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Argues that high 
levels of sellers` concentration, protected by high entry barriers, will induce firms to 
engage in price collusion, which inevitably will constrain static efficiency allocation as 
well as learning) 
Bartlett, C.A. and S. Ghoshal, 1989∗, Managing Across Borders: The 
Transnational Solution, Century Business, London (A book that shaped generations of 
management debates. Argues that the transition to transnational production networks 
increases convergence among firm strategies toward less hierarchical forms of industrial 
organization) 
  Baumol, W.J., J.C. Panzer and R.D. Willig, 1982∗, Contestable Markets and the 
Theory of Industrial Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York (Standard text on 
“contestable markets”). 
Blair, J.M., 1972∗, Economic Concentration, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New 
York (Provides taxonomy for assessing the stability of oligolies) 
Borrus, M., 1989∗, Competing for Control. America´s Stake in Microelectronics, 
Ballinger, Cambridge Mass. (Argues that the defeat of the US. semiconductor industry in 
computer memories is due to excessive internationalization and fragmented market 
structure) 
Borrus, M., 2000∗, “The Resurgence of U.S. Electronics: Asian Production 
Networks and the Rise of Wintelism”, in: Borrus, M., D. Ernst and S. Haggard (eds.), 
International Production Networks in Asia: Rivalry or Riches?, pp.57-79, Routledge, 
London (Argues that the resurgence of the U.S. electronics industry is due to heavy 
reliance on global sourcing and the control of architectural standards by Microsoft and 
Intel) 
 Borrus, M., D. Ernst and S. Haggard (eds.), 2000∗, International Production 
Networks in Asia: Rivalry or Riches?, Routledge, London ( Provides systematic 
theoretical and case study analysis of the spread of global production networks in Asia´s 
electronics industry and their impact on competitive dynamics) 
Bresnahan, T.F., 1999, “New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future 
Structure of the Computer Industry”, in: J.A. Eisenach and T.M. Lenard (eds.), 
  23 Competition, Innovation and the Microsfot Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Market 
Place, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston etc.( Argues that incumbents are vastly 
superior to newcomers due to network effects and accumulated capabilities. Does not 
address impact of internet) 
Bresnahan, T.F. and F. Malerba, 1999∗, “Industrial Dynamics and the Evolution 
of Firms´and Nations`Competitive Capabilities in the World Computer Industry”, in: 
D.C. Mowery and R.R. Nelson (eds.), Sources of Industrial Leadership. Studies in Seven 
Industries, pp. 79- 132, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Explores the impact of 
technological change on competitive dynamics and evolution of the computer industry, 
without however addressing the impact of the internet) 
Castells, M., 1998∗, The Information Age, 3 volumes, Blackwell, London (A 
broad-brush, but highly influential manifesto the New American Network Economy that 
has shaped much of the debate on the New Economy). 
Caves,  R.E., 1982∗, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge 
University Press,  Cambridge etc. (Thorough analysis of the forces that shape the 
behavior of multinational enterprises, based on neo-classical trade theory and micro-
economics) 
Chandler, A.D. et al (eds.), 1998∗,  The Dynamic Firm. The Role of Technology, 
Strategy, Organization, and Regions, Oxford University Press, Oxford etc. (Collection of 
innovative theoretical and applied contributions to the debate on how technology shapes 
location and organization of firms and industrial districts) 
Christensen, C.M., 1997∗, The Innovator´s Dilemma. When New Technologies 
Cause Great Firms to Fail, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass. (Excellent 
theoretical and empirical treatment of complex inter-relations between demand, 
technology and firm behavior. Concept of “disruptive technologies” helps to explain why 
concentration may coexist with high market volatility.) 
David, P. and D. Foray, 1995∗, “Accessing and expanding the science and 
technology knowledge-base”, STI Review, OECD, Paris (Argues that IT enhances both 
the incentives and the possibilities to codify knowledge, which facilitates international 
knowledge diffusion, but neglects the role of complementary tacit knowledge) 
Ernst, D.,  2000a∗, Moving beyond the Commodity Trap. Trade Adjustment and 
Industrial Upgrading in East Asia`s Electronics Industry, The World Bank, Washington, 
D.C., forthcoming in: Newfarmer, R., et. Al. (eds.), title & publisher to follow 
(Demonstrates that a narrow specialization on electronic commodities like computer 
memories produces periodic surplus capacity and price wars. Documents that post-crisis 
industrial upgrading has remained limited)  
Ernst, D., 2000b∗, “Placing the Networks on the Web. Challenges and 
Opportunities for Managing in Developing Asia”, paper presented at the Second Asia 
Academy of Management Conference “Managing in Asia: Challenges and Opportunities 
in the New Millenium”, December 15-18, 2000, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore ( Analyzes 
how the internet reshapes business organization and management in Asia´s computer 
industry) 
Ernst, D., 2000c, (forthcoming) ∗,“The Internationalization of Knowledge 
Support Functions: Global Production Networks in Information Industries”, Research 
Policy (Argues that an analysis of the geographic dispersion of knowledge-intensive 
  24 support services should complement existing research on the location of R&D and 
patenting) 
Ernst, D., 2000d, (forthcoming) ∗, “Global Production Networks and the 
Changing Geography of Innovation Systems. Implications for Developing Countries”, 
special issue of the Journal of the Economics of Innovation and New Technologies , on 
“Integrating Policy Perspectives in Research on Technology and Economic Growth”, 
edited by Anthony Bartzokas and Morris Teubal ( Analyzes how globalization and 
information technology enhance knowledge exchange without co-location, and spells out 
policy implications) 
Ernst, D.  1997∗, From Partial to Systemic Globalization. International 
Production Networks in the Electronics Industry, report prepared for the Sloan 
Foundation project on the Globalization in the Data Storage Industry, The Data Storage 
Industry Globalization Project Report 97-02, Graduate School of International Relations 
and Pacific Studies, University of California at San Diego (94 pages) (Combines 
historical and theoretical analysis of the emergence of global production networks in the 
electronics industry) 
Ernst, D., 1994a∗, What are the Limits to the Korean Model? The Korean 
Electronics Industry Under Pressure, A BRIE Research Monograph, The Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley 
, 129 pages (Empirical and theoretical analysis of the achievements and limits of Korea´s 
catching-up in the electronics industry) 
Ernst, D.,1983∗, The Global Race in Microelectronics, with a foreword by David 
Noble, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Campus Publishers, Frankfurt and 
New York, 290 pages ( Analyzes the drivers and impacts of early rounds of globalization 
in the semiconductor industry) 
  Ernst, D. and J. Ravenhill, 1999∗, “Globalization, Convergence, and the 
Transformation of International Production Networks in Electronics in East Asia”, 
Business & Politics (University of California at Berkeley), Vol I#1 (Demonstrates why 
partial convergence of business organization goes hand in hand with persistent diversity) 
Ernst, D. and D. O'Connor, 1992∗, Competing in the Electronics Industry. The 
Experience of Newly Industrialising Economies, Development Centre Studies, OECD, 
Paris, 303 pages (Combines historical and theoretical analysis of competitive dynamics in 
the electronics industry, and its impact on late entry strategies) 
  Ferguson, Charles H. and Charles R. Morris, 1993∗,  Computer Wars. How the 
West can win in a post-IBM World, Times Books, New York  (Tells the story of “IBM´s 
self-immolation”, and argues that reintegrating innovation and manufacturing within 
global corporations, combined with aggressive technology policies, can reestablish U.S. 
leadership in computers) 
Fine, C., 1998∗, Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary 
Advantage, Reading, mass: Perseus Books (Documents growing importance of time 
management in global and knowledge-intensive industries) 
Flamm, Kenneth,1999, “ Digital Convergence? The Set-Top Box and the 
Network Computer”, in: J.A. Eisenach and T.M. Lenard (eds.), Competition, Innovation 
and the Microsfot Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Market Place, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston etc. (Provides evidence that telecommunications costs are finally 
  25 beginning to decline at rates that resemble those found for semiconductors and 
computers, and explores implications for competitive dynamics.) 
Flamm, Kenneth,1988, Creating the Computer. Government, Industry and High 
Technology, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.  (Classic study on the sources 
of U.S. leadership in the computer industry, with a focus on the impact of innovation on 
competitive dynamics).  
Florida and Sturgeon, 1999∗, Final report to Sloan Foundation, manuscript, MIT, 
Cambridge/Mass.(Argues that a new  “American Model of Manufacturing”, based on 
global outsourcing is now being extended beyond electronics to the car industry) 
Gilder, G., 1988∗, “The Revitalization of Everything: The Law of the 
Microcosm”, Harvard Business Review, March-April (Early proponent of the “New 
Economy Doctrine”: argues that the PC industry is immune to concentration, due to the 
rapid pace of innovation) 
Grove, A.S., 1996∗, Only the Paranoid Survive. How to Exploit the Crisis Points 
that Challenge Every Company and Career, Harper Collins Business, New York and 
London (The former Chairman & CEO of Intel provides a vivid account of how 
unexpected changes in markets and technology, combined with a drastic reduction in 
product-life-cycles, constantly challenges leadership positions) 
Henderson, R. and K. Clark, 1990∗ “Architectural Innovation: The 
Reconfiguration of Existing Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms”, 
Administrative Sciences Quarterly, pp. 9-30 (Argues that sharp shifts in markets and 
technology are competence-destroying in their effects on incumbent firms and result in 
the displacement of market leaders) 
Hobday, M., 1995∗, Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to Japan, Edward 
Elgar, Aldershot (Provides a sequential stages-model of technology mastery for Asia`s 
electronics industry that neglects the diversity of approaches and their non-linear 
evolutionary character) 
Kenney, M., (ed.), 2000∗, Anatomy of Silicon Valley: Understanding an 
Entrepreneurial Region ( A collection of articles that argues that Silicon Valley 
represents the essence of America`s New Entrepreneurial Economy) 
Kobrin, S.J.,1997∗, “The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a 
Networked Global Economy”, in: J.H. Dunning (ed.), Governments, Globalization and 
International Business, Oxford University Press, London etc (Argues that scale 
economies in R&D acts as main driver of globalization in knowledge-intensive 
industries) 
Kogut, B. and U. Zander, 1993∗, “Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary 
Theory of the Multinational Corporation”, Journal of International Business Studies, 
fourth quarter (Argues that a firm`s capacity to build specialized capabilities quicker and 
at less cost than its competitors is of critical importance for competitive success) 
Langlois, R.N.,1992∗, “External Economies and Economic Progress: The Case of 
the Microcomputer Industry”, Business History Review, Vol. 66 (Spring), pp. 1-50 
(Argues that U.S. leadership in the PC industry is due to the outsourcing of “external 
capabilities” that reside within a network of interacting firms) 
Langlois, R.N. and W.E. Steinmueller, 1999∗, “The Evolution of Competitive 
Advantage in the Worldwide Semiconductor Industry, 1947-1996”, in: D.C. Mowery and 
  26 R.R. Nelson (eds.), Sources of Industrial Leadership. Studies in Seven Industries, pp. 79- 
132, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Argues that the main sources of U.S. 
leadership in the semiconductor industry are a rapid diffusion of basic technologies and 
peculiar features of its competitive dynamics and industrial organization) 
  Lazonick, W., 1991∗, Business Organization and the Myth of the Market 
Economy, Cambridge University Press (By combining a historical and theoretical 
analysis of changes in industrial leadership positions, the book highlights the failure of 
economic analysis to come to grips with divergent organizational structures of business 
enterprises.) 
  Lipsey, R.G., C. Bekar and K. Carlaw, 2000, forthcoming, Time, Technology and 
Markets. Explorations in Economic Growth and Restructuring, Publisher to follow, (An 
important alternative approach to the study of technology, markets and economic growth. 
Demonstrates the limits of neo-classical models that equate technological change with 
productivity growth.) 
Mathews, J. and Dong-Sung Cho, 2000∗, Tiger Technology: The Creation of the 
Semiconductor Industry in east Asia, Cambridge University Press (Traces the Catching-
Up of East Asia in the Semiconductor Industry, based on processes of organizational 
learning) 
OECD, 2000∗, A New Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and 
Information Technology in Growth, Paris  (Concise overview of the role of innovation 
and information technology in economic growth) 
Pugh, Emerson W., 1984∗, Memories that Shaped an Industry. Decision Leading 
to IBM System/360, The MIT Press (An insider’s account of how IBM established its 
leadership position in mainframe computers) 
Reed Electronics Research, 1998∗, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, Volume 
2 - America, Japan & Asia Pacific, Sutton, Surrey  (Standard source for trade and 
production data) 
  Richardson, G.B., 1996∗, “ Competition, Innovation and Increasing Returns”, 
DRUID Working Paper #96-10, July (A masterful plea to place new product 
development and innovation at the center of competition theory) 
Richardson, G.B., 1997∗, “Economic Analysis, Public Policy and the Software 
Industry”, DRUID Working Paper # 97-4, April (Explores why first-mover advantages 
matter less in the software industry) 
  Sutton, J., 1991∗, Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. (A methodologically brilliant treatment of sunk costs-theory that however neglects 
the issue of innovation) 
Teece, D., 1986∗, “Profiting from Technological Innovation”, Research Policy, 
15/6: 285-306  (Pioneering analysis of the systemic nature of innovation) 
Tilton, J.E., 1971∗, International Diffusion of technology: The Case of 
Semiconductors, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (Essential reading for 
anyone interested in the historical sources of U.S. leadership in the electronics industry. 




  27 